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1. Introduction 
 
Classic theories of federalism envision a community of sovereigns that come together 
and delegate limited powers to a central government in order to achieve collective 
goods like common defense, free trade, or a common currency (Riker 1964).   In order 
to solve collective action problems, the federated units often find it necessary to 
delegate some powers of taxation to the center.  For 19th century federations, the 
centralization of tariffs as part of a drive to create a common internal market was often a 
driving impetus for the formation of the union.  Centralized taxation then opens the door 
to fiscal redistribution between federated units.  Spurred on by World War I and the 
Great Depression, central governments during the 20th century gained access to forms of 
direct taxation and tools for inter-provincial redistribution that could not have been 
imagined by the founders of early confederations.   
In fact, over the course of the 20th century, some federations have developed a 
political rhetoric, in some cases enshrined in the constitution, whereby residents of the 
poorest localities are entitled to the same public services at the same cost as residents of 
the wealthiest localities.  Accordingly, they have developed progressive forms of 
taxation, direct central government expenditure programs, and intergovernmental grants 
that transfer resources from taxpayers in wealthy provinces to those in poor provinces.   
On the one hand, this is not surprising.  A workhorse model of political 
economy suggests that with full-franchise democracy and a right-skewed income 
distribution, the poor should be able to extract transfers from the rich (Romer 1975, 
Meltzer and Richard 1981, Boix 2003).  Indeed, the expansion of suffrage in early 20th 
century Europe seems to have been a precursor to the development of the modern 
welfare state (Lindert 2004).  To the extent that the rich and poor are geographically 
clustered, democracies should be characterized by redistribution from wealthy to poor 
jurisdictions.  This might take the form of inter-personal transfers such as 
unemployment insurance or income support, but it might also take the form of subsidies 
for public goods like education or infrastructure in poor neighborhoods with limited tax 
base.  To the extent that these goods are provided by local or provincial governments, 
this implies intergovernmental transfers that are negatively correlated with income.   
But on the other hand, such inter-regional redistribution should be surprising in 
formal federations, which are thought to provide mechanisms to prevent both inter-
personal and inter-regional redistribution.  First, the rich can cluster in certain regions in 
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order to avoid being taxed by the poor (Boix 2003), a clustering which may occur 
naturally from agglomeration economies in industrialized societies (Krugman 1991).   
However, this might merely encourage the poor to push for centralized taxation (Bolton 
and Roland 1997). While a low-income coalition might form easily in a unitary system 
where the autonomy of local governments was snuffed out in the 19th century, one of 
the defining features of federalism is that changes from the status quo rely on majorities 
(or super-majorities) of regional representatives rather than individuals or 
representatives of small districts.  Thus in federations that started with zero direct 
central taxation in the 19th century, the institutions of federalism would seem to provide 
representatives of wealthy regions the opportunity to stave off the erection of a 
centralized tax-transfers system, or to limit the progressiveness of inter-regional 
transfers.  Diaz-Cayeros (2006) argues that this logic explains why wealthy states in 
Mexico have been able to avoid the erection of progressive redistribution at moments of 
tax centralization.  Moreover, a large literature portrays federalism as an impediment to 
the construction of the post-war welfare state in OECD countries (see Castles, Obinger 
and Leibfried  2005 for an overview).   
Which of these intuitions is correct?  This chapter argues that the answer lies in 
the architecture of federal institutions, and these institutions are in large part a product 
of the environments in which the most important federal bargains were struck.  In all 
modern federations, taxes collected by the central government are distributed to 
provinces through intergovernmental grants, but in some countries these grants are 
highly progressive while in others they are not.  This chapter first lays out the relevant 
empirical patterns in eight federations and the European Union, and then introduces 
some new arguments about the institutions and historical legacies that might explain the 
divergence.     
While some attention has been given to the relationship between federalism and 
the generosity of inter-personal transfers, less is known about federalism and inter-
regional redistribution.  Above all, I demonstrate that in the latter part of the 20th 
century, some federations—namely the United States, Argentina, Brazil, India, and the 
European Union—pursued very little progressive inter-regional redistribution, while 
others—like Australia, Canada, Germany, and Spain—pursued a great deal.   These 
stylized facts are in accordance with other studies.   
Next, I seek explanations for this cross-country variation by building on positive 
theories of institutions.  Recognizing the pitfalls of broad macro-historical comparisons 
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with small numbers of observations, I point out two aspects of institutional design that 
hold promise.  First, the separation of executive and legislative powers in presidential 
systems creates incentives to de-emphasize national programmatic appeals by political 
parties, and generates a style of coalition-building that is characterized by regional pork-
barrel politics that makes progressive transfers an unlikely outcome.  In contrast, the 
concentration of agenda power in the hands of the government under parliamentary 
democracy encourages programmatic national appeals that can empower a national low-
income coalition.   
Second, I examine the potential impact of regional representation in the 
legislature.  In federations that trace their origins to constitutional compacts among 
sovereigns, units with greater bargaining power at the moment of confederation—those 
perceiving greater risks associated with unification—were able to extract over-
representation in at least the upper chamber of the legislature, and sometimes the lower 
as well.  These states were often in the agricultural periphery, and have in many cases 
only lost population over time.  This institutional legacy can undermine the formation of 
a cohesive low-income coalition in the legislature by creating the opportunity for high-
income provinces to coalesce with over-represented poor provinces, leaving the larger 
poor provinces out and keeping the overall size of transfers down relative to a 
legislature with one-person-one-vote apportionment. 
 I also discuss a simpler logic through which regional upper chambers might 
limit redistribution, regardless of apportionment. If redistribution is ultimately the 
response of democratic institutions to a right-skewed income distribution, by generating 
large winner-take-all districts, senates in some federations may muffle demands for 
redistribution by compressing the politically relevant income distribution—that of the 
provincial medians— so that its distribution is much more symmetric than that of 
individuals or district medians.   
Finally, I argue that contemporary patterns of inter-regional redistribution are 
difficult to understand without examining the initial constitutional bargain.  After all, if 
inter-regional transfers are simply ways for the poor to exploit the rich, one must ask 
why the union was Pareto-optimal for the rich in the first place.  In federations with 
origins in the 18th or 19th centuries, a key conflict was between the industrializing core, 
which desired a unified high tariff in order to protect its nascent manufacturing efforts, 
and an agricultural periphery that desired free trade and low tariffs.  Both had something 
to gain from confederation, but the risks were greater for the periphery.  Thus 
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representatives of agriculture demanded not only greater representation in the central 
legislature, but also compensatory transfers.  In some federations, modern systems of 
inter-regional redistribution and the accompanying political rhetoric of equal service 
provision had roots in an earlier struggle to forge a national common market. 
In sum, this chapter suggests that Argentina, Brazil, and the United States have 
avoided the highly progressive inter-regional redistribution schemes that characterize 
other federations, not to mention unitary systems, largely because they retain 
institutional features from an earlier era of bargains and battles over the basic federal 
contract.  The same is true of the European Union, where the basic contract is still under 
negotiation.  In other federations that lack these features, a low-income coalition has 
been able to lock in a system of redistributive transfers along with the growth of the 
modern welfare state.       
The next section measures the progressiveness of intergovernmental transfers 
around the world.  The third section offers institutional explanations for cross-country 
differences in the post-war period, the penultimate section examines the underlying 
federal bargains, and the final section concludes.   
 
2. Empirical analysis of inter-regional redistribution 
 
After publication of the MacDougall Report in 1977, interest in broad comparative 
empirical work on the subject of inter-regional fiscal flows died down until it was 
revived by the literature on optimal currency areas in the early 1990s.  A key question in 
this literature concerned the extent to which the tax-transfers policies of the central 
government played a stabilizing function with respect to short-term asymmetric regional 
shocks (e.g. Sala-i-Martín and Sachs 1992, Bayoumi and Masson 1995).  This literature 
was not explicitly concerned with long-term inter-regional redistribution.  More 
recently, a series of papers builds on the approach of Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and 
attempts to build comparable cross-country data on net fiscal flows in a variety of 
countries in order to measure long-term patterns of inter-regional redistribution (Espasa 
2001; Barberán, Bosch, Castells, and Espasa 2000; Bosh, Espasa, and Sorribas 2002).   
Several papers in this volume address the challenges and controversies 
associated with measuring net fiscal flows.  Some of these challenges—e.g. how to 
count expenditures for military bases or branches of federal banks— make cross-
country comparisons especially difficult.  Largely because of accounting challenges and 
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data availability, this paper addresses a more specific form of inter-regional 
redistribution: that pursued through intergovernmental grants.  This allows me to 
examine comparable data from several of the world’s largest federations.  While it is 
unfortunate to ignore inter-regional redistribution that takes place through direct federal 
expenditures and on the tax side, previous studies have revealed that across countries, 
the estimated redistributiveness of grants is highly correlated with that of overall fiscal 
flows, and in fact, cross-country differences in fiscal flows are driven primarily by 
differences in intergovernmental grants.   
This chapter employs yearly inflation-adjusted data on total intergovernmental 
receipts that enter the budgets of state or provincial governments, along with inflation-
adjusted data on provincial GDP per capita, in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Germany, India, Spain, and the United States, as well as the European Union. Unlike 
most studies on fiscal flows, this chapter uses a relatively long time series for each 
country.1         
  Following the papers cited above, for each year in each country I calculate the 
income elasticity of grants as follows:         
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where G is the real per capita grant, Y is provincial GDP per capita, and the subscript i 
refers to province i and m refer to the average of all provinces.  The coefficient µ is 
analytically useful, but it might be very large and negative in a country where grants are 
progressive but substantively small (e.g. the European Union), so it is also useful to 
measure the redistributive “power” of grants as follows: 
 
 
    (2) 
 
where 1 – β captures the redistributive power of grants.   Intuitively, if β = 1, a 
province’s relative income before transfers is perfectly correlated with its relative 
income after transfers and, ignoring the regional impact of taxation, no redistribution 
has taken place through the system of intergovernmental grants.  A β coefficient of .8 
                                                
1 Data sources and inflation adjustment procedures are detailed in the appendix.   
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would indicate that 80 percent of the initial differences in relative per capita incomes 
remain after grants have been distributed.          
Bosh, Espasa, and Sorribas (2002) estimate these parameters with net fiscal 
flows.  While their estimates of 1 – β are of course higher since they take full 
consideration of taxes and direct central government expenditures, for the same years in 
the five countries that overlap with my data set on grants, their estimates of µ and 1 – β 
are correlated with mine at .91 and .95 respectively.  Thus while the cross-country 
comparisons below ignore taxation and direct central expenditures, they likely reflect 
broader cross-country differences in inter-provincial redistribution.    
Since the focus of this chapter is on redistribution rather than risk-sharing,2 I 
estimate the income elasticity and redistributive power of grants using single-year 
snapshots in each country, and display the parameters averaged over all years, along 
with average upper and lower confidence intervals, in Figure 1.    
                                                
2 Some of the controversy in the empirical literature is about the conflation of insurance and redistribution 
effects (e.g. Von Hagen 1992).  The goal here is to focus exclusively on redistribution by avoiding time-
series analysis.   
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Figure 1a: Income elasticity of grants in 9 federations, 1990-2005 
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Figure 1b: The redistributive power of grants in 9 federations, 1990-2005 
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Figure 1a reveals that grants are highly progressive in Canada, Germany, Spain, and to a 
slightly lesser extent the European Union and Australia.  Note that the imprecision of 
the Spanish estimate is driven by outliers and changes over time.  No matter which 
autonomous communities are included, the negative coefficient is becoming larger over 
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time, and has been statistically significant since the late 1990s.  Moreover, the 
coefficient is always significant (and larger) if outliers—in particular Extremadura, the 
Basque Country, and Catalonia—are dropped.  Without Catalonia and the Basque 
Country, the coefficient is consistently in the range of the Canadian or German 
estimates.  The Australian estimates are imprecise partially because of the small number 
of states and territories (8), but also because the Australian Capital Territory, the 
Northern Territory, and Western Australia are outliers with high income and large 
grants (more on this below).        
In contrast, no matter how one tortures the data, intergovernmental grants in 
Argentina, Brazil, India, and the United States are simply not progressive.  In Argentina 
the coefficient is actually positive and bordering on statistically significant, while in 
Brazil and India the coefficient is zero.   In the United States, the coefficient is generally 
positive if one includes all states, but as we shall see below, Alaska and Wyoming are 
prominent outliers, and without them the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero.  In 
Argentina, Brazil, and India, there are specific grants with some progressivity built into 
the formulae, and indeed, these grants are negatively correlated with provincial income, 
but these effects are overwhelmed when other, more discretionary grants are considered 
as well.   
It is also useful to get a sense for the size of intergovernmental transfers along 
with comparative estimates of progressivity.  Figure 1b displays the redistributive power 
of grants in each federation.  In four of the federations with highly progressive grants—
Australia, Germany, Spain, and especially Canada—the substantive impact of 
redistribution is impressive.  In the European Union, on the other hand, the impact is 
negligible since grants are so small relative to GDP.  In the United States and India, 
where grants are not progressive in the first place, grants have little redistributive 
power.  In Argentina and Brazil, redistributive power is somewhat larger, but as we 
shall see below, the redistribution favors small rather than poor provinces.   
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Figure 2: 1997 Distribution of real GDP and provincial expenditures per 
capita across provinces, expressed as share of average 
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It is also useful to examine whether intergovernmental transfers to provincial 
governments have an equalizing impact on their expenditures.  I have also assembled 
data on real per capita expenditures of the provinces in each federation, and Figure 2 
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displays kernel densities of both real GDP per capita and real expenditures per capita, 
expressed as shares of provincial averages, for the year 1997 (other years look very 
similar).  In the United States and the three middle-income federations, the distribution 
of expenditures is virtually identical to that of provincial income.  Inter-regional 
inequalities in tax base are directly reflected in inequalities in service provision, and 
across provinces, real expenditures per capita are positively correlated with income.   
The second group of federations shows a strikingly different relationship.  In 
Australia and Canada, the distribution of expenditures is much tighter around the 
national average and more symmetric than the inter-provincial income distribution.3  In 
these two federations, income and expenditures are uncorrelated.  In Germany, the 
bipolar distribution of GDP across Länder corresponds to the “old” and “new” (Eastern) 
Länder.  However, the equalization system brings the distribution together, and in fact, 
the cluster of states with above-average expenditures per capita are the relatively poor 
states, and unlike most other federations, if one ignores the two Hanseatic city-states, 
there is actually a strong negative correlation between income and expenditures per 
capita.  Spain may appear quite different at first glance, because in contrast to other 
federations, the expenditure distribution is wider than the income distribution. This is 
because, as in Germany, a high level of inter-provincial redistribution assures that many 
of the relatively poor autonomous communities end up with above-average 
expenditures, and the communities on the far left of the expenditure distribution are 
actually the wealthiest, like Madrid and the Balearic Islands.  Spain is like Germany in 
that expenditures are negatively correlated with income, and the equalization system 
brings about a reversal of fortunes.       
In sum, this section draws a distinction between two rather different forms of 
federalism.  In India, Latin America, and the United States, along with the European 
Union, grants from central governments do little to redistribute resources from wealthy 
to poor provinces.  On the other hand, grants are progressive and redistributive in the 
European and Commonwealth federations.   
 
 
 
                                                
3 Note that the territories are not included in Figure 2.  The inclusion of the Northern Territory and 
Australian Capital Territory would generate a more right-skewed distribution of both expenditures and 
income.   
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3. The political economy of inter-provincial redistribution 
 
What explains these striking cross-country differences?  The political economy 
literature has surprisingly little to say.  The tendency in the public economics literature 
has been to view grants as efficient responses by benevolent governments to potential 
inefficiencies associated with externalities and inter-jurisdictional inequity (see e.g. 
Boadway and Flatters 1982).  Yet all of the efficiency arguments made in favor of the 
Canadian equalization system should apply in the United States as well, where such a 
system has not emerged.  More often, one encounters the rather informal argument that 
inter-provincial equality in service provision is a defining part of the Canadian (or 
Australian, or German) national identity, and citizens of wealthy provinces perceive that 
they have a moral responsibility to pay into a generous system of inter-regional 
transfers.  This claim seems questionable at best, however, when one considers the 
disdain expressed toward inter-regional redistribution among wealthy taxpayers in 
Alberta, Catalonia, Baden-Württenberg, and New South Wales, and the efforts by 
representatives of such regions to alter the system.  The rhetoric of national solidarity 
and equal service provision rings too hollow to provide a satisfying explanation, and in 
any case, this begs more interesting questions about the political origins of such 
rhetoric.   
The tenor of complaints from provinces like Baden-Württenberg and Catalonia 
suggest that the fiscal system exploits the citizens of rich regions.  Yet the dominant 
political economy literature largely rules out the possibility of exploitation in a 
federation.  In Bolton and Roland (1997) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003), democratic 
federations are essentially voluntary, and provinces can unilaterally vote at any time for 
full independence, or at least a decentralized tax regime that minimizes inter-provincial 
redistribution (see also Buchanan and Faith 1987).  For the democratic federations 
examined here, this “voluntary federation” approach captures the dynamics of 18th and 
19th century federal bargains, when in Argentina, Brazil, Australia, Canada, the United 
States, and in the German Zollverein, the center possessed very limited capacity to tax 
in practice, secession threats were commonplace, and in some cases, constituent units 
presided over powerful militias.  Yet over time, the central government gained access to 
new forms of direct taxation and gained a monopoly over military force, and the 
constitutions generally do not grant unilateral secession rights or vetoes over tax policy 
to individual provinces.  Exploited regions in most modern federations are essentially 
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stuck unless they are able to threaten a military insurgency or pursue other options not 
specified in the constitution.     
Figure 2 above demonstrates that the inter-provincial income distribution is 
universally right-skewed in democratic federations, and if wealthy regions cannot 
credibly threaten to secede, the median voter logic would seem to imply that inter-
regional redistribution is unavoidable.  Yet Figure 2 also reveals that the federations 
with the most dramatically skewed inter-provincial income distributions are those that 
engage in the smallest amount of inter-provincial redistribution.   
The political economy literature does not provide any obvious explanations for 
these patterns.  The most relevant work is Bermandi (2007, 2008) and Beramendi and 
Diaz-Cayeros (2006).  As in Bolton and Roland (1997), these papers derive preferences 
of actors from their place in the inter-regional and inter-personal income distribution, 
but rely on alternatives to simple majority rule for determining the level of 
centralization.  For instance, they examine the possibility that poor, unequal regions like 
the U.S. South and Brazilian Northeast are captured by the wealthy, who are then over-
represented in malapportioned upper chambers, and the possibility that incentives of 
regional politicians are shaped by party systems that can be viewed as exogenous.  
These papers are primarily about the relative centralization of the tax-transfer 
system, however, and have less to say about the progressivity of inter-provincial 
transfers.  If anything, these papers predict that intergovernmental transfers in the Latin 
American federations should be highly progressive, which is inconsistent with the data 
presented above.  While highlighting some similar aspects of institutions and party 
systems, the remainder of this chapter lays out some related but distinct arguments, 
building on a different theoretical literature that highlights legislative bargaining.  The 
most important departure is that this chapter views progressive intergovernmental 
transfers as a complement rather than a substitute for progressive inter-personal tax-
transfer systems.   
As the franchise expanded in the 20th century in industrialized democracies, 
political entrepreneurs on the left attempted to mobilize a low-income coalition with 
programmatic appeals in favor of redistribution.  While the literature focuses primarily 
on inter-personal transfers, this redistribution also took the form of progressive 
subsidies for public services in low-income areas.  Inter-governmental grants were 
especially important tools for the low-income coalition in federations where the central 
government lacked either the constitutional prerogative or administrative apparatus to 
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implement redistributive programs directly.  Grants that are indexed to a jurisdiction’s 
average income or tax base can be a blunt tool for redistribution, since they might 
bolster the expenditures on the poor in poor jurisdictions (e.g. Nova Scotia) to a greater 
extent than those on the poor in wealthy but unequal jurisdictions (e.g. Ontario).  
However, subsidies to the poor in poor regions have a powerful benefit for the poor in 
wealthy regions if they reduce incentives for inter-regional mobility that would put 
pressure on wages and welfare benefits in the wealthy region.  In a federation with 
decentralized expenditures and mobile capital and labor, it is self-defeating for a low-
income coalition to push for new expenditure programs that will be enjoyed only in 
regions with a high tax base.    
In short, I begin with the straightforward proposition that progressive inter-
governmental transfers have been the favored policy of a national low-income coalition 
in federations in the 20th century.  Some institutional features of democracies—namely 
presidentialism and a territory-based upper chamber—undermine the creation of such a 
coalition.  Some of these institutions, in turn, are legacies of an earlier era when the 
basic federal bargain was being negotiated.   
 
Presidential and parliamentary democracy  
In a parliamentary system, the executive is formed directly from the legislature.  All 
members of the majority party or coalition forming the government have valuable 
agenda powers over taxation and redistribution, and in the event of disagreement, they 
can be induced to act cohesively because of the threat of a no-confidence vote, which 
would threaten their agenda powers (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998).  In a presidential 
democracy, the executive is elected separately from the legislature, and has no such tool 
with which to induce legislative cohesion.   
In practice, legislative cohesion is greater in parliamentary than presidential 
systems.  Moreover, since agenda control is so valuable, party discipline and a uniform 
party platform across districts arise endogenously in a parliamentary system, and the 
success of individual candidates is driven primarily by voters’ assessments of the 
platform and performance of the candidate’s party.  In many industrialized 
parliamentary democracies, political parties form around a class or income cleavage, 
and voting behavior is correlated with income, both at the individual level and at the 
district level.  Thus the party or parties of the left form a cohesive cross-district coalition 
representing poor voters.  To the extent that income is right-skewed across individuals 
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and electoral districts, parliamentary systems generate incentives for progressive 
taxation and redistribution.  As the low-income coalition cohered over the course of the 
20th century in parliamentary federations like Canada and Australia, the constitutional 
and administrative strength of the provinces and states created barriers to the erection of 
direct national programs.  Instead, these programs were funded through transfers that 
were distributed according to income and other indicators of need.  In parliamentary 
federations of more recent vintage—Germany and Spain—highly redistributive transfer 
systems have also been championed by a national low-income coalition represented by 
the parties of the left.   
Presidentialism favors a rather different politics of redistribution.  
Representatives of various electoral districts do not face incentives to form cohesive 
coalitions in order to form and maintain a government with agenda control.  
Accordingly, incentives for party discipline are weak, and party platforms need not be 
coordinated across candidates, who face incentives to claim credit for providing private 
goods to their districts rather than national collective goods.  Perhaps the most common 
way of modeling such a legislature is based on Baron and Ferejohn (1989), where the 
representative of one district is randomly selected as the agenda setter for a spending 
project, and she attempts to build the minimum winning coalition that preserves the 
greatest surplus for her district.  A key feature of these models is that districts compete 
to get into the winning coalition, bidding down the price that must be paid by the 
agenda setting district.  Districts with the lowest default payoffs, and those representing 
the smallest districts, are most likely to be part of the winning coalition.   
Random assignment of agenda-setting powers may not be an appropriate 
assumption, especially in countries where the president is the agenda-setter in the 
budget process.  Nevertheless, absent a no-confidence procedure, the president—even a 
leftist with a redistributive platform—must buy votes from individual legislators—
perhaps even co-partisans—who do not internalize the political benefits of policies with 
dispersed beneficiaries.  Trying to preserve enough surplus to fund favored national 
policies, the president assembles the cheapest possible winning coalition in the 
legislature, causing legislators to compete against one another for membership as in the 
Baron-Ferejohn model.   
This type of legislative bargaining model seems to provide some insights into 
coalition-building in Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, where committee leaders 
and presidents clearly use discretionary spending projects and intergovernmental grants 
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to achieve winning legislative coalitions.  The dictates of legislative bargaining might 
help explain the weak correlation between provincial income and grants in these 
federations.  Ignoring for a moment asymmetries in district size, even when the poorest 
districts are agenda-setters, they must offer a sufficiently attractive share of the pie to 
middle-income jurisdictions with higher default payoffs (and a higher share of the tax 
burden) to join the coalition.  When middle-income jurisdictions have proposal power, 
the poor jurisdictions, with their lower default payoffs, will be attractive partners, but it 
will be possible to include them at very low cost.   
Moreover, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) demonstrate how an open amendment 
rule can reduce the advantages of the agenda setter and bring about an equal division of 
the pie among the majority coalition, or under some conditions, generate a 
“universalistic” outcome in which every district receives an equal share.  Baron (1991) 
points out that for bills that have high potential for pork-barrel inefficiencies, the 
legislature has an incentive to designate an open rule, and this is often the practice in the 
United States.   
   
Regional representation and legislative bargaining 
Even with a presidential system, no party discipline, and an open rule with the style of 
legislative bargaining outlined above, one might still expect to find a negative 
correlation between district income and grants per capita. When building coalitions, 
poor districts will seek out other poor districts due to their low default payoffs, and if 
the distribution of income across districts is very right skewed, a poor district will be the 
agenda setter most of the time.  But this can easily be undone by another powerful 
determinate of a representative’s default payoff:  district size.    Small districts are more 
likely to be recruited into winning legislative coalitions because their votes are cheaper.   
A large body of empirical research in several federations demonstrates that other 
things equal, over-represented states receive disproportionate expenditures and 
intergovernmental grants per capita (for a literature review, see Rodden 2002).  Over-
representation of small jurisdictions is especially pronounced in the upper chambers of 
federations.  Among the federations under analysis here, the most malapportioned are 
Argentina, Brazil, and the European Union.  In Argentina and Brazil, small states are 
over-represented not only in the senates, but in the lower chambers as well, and both 
chambers are very powerful. In the United States and Australia, the upper chamber is 
powerful and highly malapportioned due to equal representation of states, while the 
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lower chamber is much closer to population-based apportionment.  The German 
Bundesrat over-represents small states as well, though less dramatically than the United 
States, and its assent is required somewhat less frequently than the other federations 
listed above.  The Canadian, Indian, and Spanish systems do not feature powerful upper 
chambers, and malapportionment in the lower chamber is modest compared with the 
other federations.   
In cross-section regressions that control for GDP per capita (not shown to save 
space), there is a strong, statistically significant negative relationship between 
population and intergovernmental grants per capita in the countries with legislatures that 
over-represent small states (Argentina, Brazil, the EU, Germany, Australia, and the 
United States).  In fact, the negative coefficient is largest in the countries with the 
highest degree of malapportionment.  There is no evidence of small-state bias in the 
three federations without strong territorial representation (Canada, India, and Spain).  
This suggests that the frequently observed relationship between size and 
intergovernmental grants is indeed a reflection of legislative bargaining rather than the 
higher per capita costs of providing public goods in small jurisdictions (Alesina and 
Spolaore 2003).   
 
17
Figure 3: Real GDP per capita and real grants per capita, expressed as share of 
average 
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Figure 3 (cont): Real GDP per capita and real grants per capita, expressed as 
share of average 
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Using provincial averages from the 1990s, Figure Three displays income per capita on 
the horizontal axis and grants per capita on the vertical axis, each expressed as shares of 
the national average.  The size of the bubble in each graph corresponds to the log of the 
province’s population.  Each graph also includes a fitted regression line.  Note that in 
the federations with strong institutions of regional representation, the smallest bubbles 
are generally above the fitted line, and at most levels of income, the smaller provinces 
receive more grants than larger provinces at similar income levels.        
But to what extend does the over-representation of small provinces undermine 
the correlation between income and grants?  If size is perfectly correlated with income, 
malapportionment should only improve the bargaining position of the poor.  However, 
if the correlation is weak, or even negative (as in Germany), there can be a class of 
small provinces that is more attractive than poor provinces as coalition members.  In the 
extreme case, one can envision a coalition of wealthy provinces and small provinces 
that use their agenda control opportunities to exclude the large, poor provinces.  Instead 
of forming a coalition with poor provinces to tax the wealthy and redistribute to 
themselves, middle- or low-income small provinces can offer the wealthy provinces a 
lower tax than what would have been offered by a purely low-income coalition, and 
keep for themselves the lion’s share of the expenditures. 
Indeed, something like this might be occurring in the presidential federations.  
Note that for Argentina in Figure 3, without the smallest provinces, one can envision a 
slight negative correlation between income and grants, but a group of small provinces—
one that covers the entire income spectrum—has apparently been extremely attractive as 
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coalition partners.  With Argentina’s extreme form of province-based representation, 
one can easily envision a winning coalition that is composed of provinces with above-
average income and a handful of small, poor provinces.  In Brazil, the smallest states in 
the Northeast have clearly been attractive coalition partners.  These are poor states, but 
again, one can envision a winning Senate coalition combining wealthy and small states, 
and keeping more dramatic redistribution at bay.  
In the United States, moderate small-state bias is the only discernable 
relationship.  Ever since the formation of the New Deal coalition in the 1930s, it has 
appeared that small, sparsely populated states have been important targets of vote-
buying efforts by political entrepreneurs attempting to introduce progressive reforms 
(Wright 1974, Anderson and Tollison 1991).  Thus instead of targeting the poorest 
regions with relief expenditures, as with Canadian programs originating in the great 
depression, the distribution of grants in the United States reflect the logic of legislative 
coalition-building, especially in the Senate. 
In the European Union, total transfers from Brussels are progressive.  Over-
represented states have traditionally been favored in the distribution of transfers, which 
does introduce some outliers that weaken the relationship between income and grants, 
but the effect has not been large enough to undermine the relationship altogether.     
If one considers the wealthy Hanseatic city-states in Germany, as well as the two 
territories in Australia, it would appear that over-representation in the upper chamber 
does indeed favor small states in these federations, and this weakens the correlation 
between income and grants to some extent.  In Germany this weakens the relationship 
only slightly because of a pair of outliers among 16 states.  But in Australia, the 
inclusion of the two territories, both of which are over-represented in the Senate, causes 
the relationship to lose significance.  Relatively wealthy and over-represented Western 
Australia is also an outlier among the states that pushes in the same direction.   
Since they are parliamentary federations with strong, disciplined parties, one 
might not expect evidence of this type of legislative bargaining in Australia and 
Germany.  Parties do play an important role in both the Bundesrat and the Australian 
Senate, yet the chief executive cannot threaten to impose a vote of no confidence, 
creating greater scope for bargaining over the distribution of funds between 
representatives of states, even within the governing party or coalition, than in the lower 
chamber (see Pitlik, Schneider, and Strotman 2005).  In this environment, small states 
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may be well-positioned to extract disproportionate benefits in spite of disciplined 
political parties.4   
In Australia, “small” and “poor” were descriptors that could be used 
interchangeably for the recipient states in the intergovernmental system from the early 
era of confederation in the 19th century until recently (Tasmania, Western Australia, and 
South Australia).  Thus for most of Australian history, if anything, malapportionment 
may have only enhanced progressive redistribution.  More recently, however, natural 
resource booms have lifted the Northern Territory and Western Australia well above the 
national average, yet they have maintained a favorable position in the distribution of 
transfers, perhaps in part because of favorable political representation.    
Canada and Spain are examples of parliamentary federations with strong party 
discipline, upper chambers that have little or no veto authority in the distribution of 
resources, and relatively little malapportionment in the lower chamber.  Thus small 
states have no special bargaining power that would undermine the low-income coalition 
in favor of equalization.  In Canada, Figure 3 shows that the negative correlation 
between GDP per capita and grants is very tight, and controlling for income, small 
provinces are not favored.  In Spain, if anything there is a bias in favor of large states.  
The negative correlation between income and grants is weakened by Catalonia and the 
Basque Country.  Moreover, the Spanish case may also reveal that legislative bargaining 
also plays a role even in parliamentary systems with strong parties, especially under 
minority government.  Regional parties from these two autonomous communities have 
frequently been pivotal partners propping up minority governments, putting them in a 
position to extract extra resources (see Solé-Ollé, this volume).  This weakens but does 
not destroy the negative relationship between income and grants.        
While over-representation of small states may appear to be important in India in 
Figure 3, this reflects grants to the “special category” states on India’s Northeast border.  
It is true that these states are slightly over-represented, and perhaps some part of their 
special status is a product of legislative bargaining, but it seems more likely that these 
transfers reflect other features of these states.   If these states are dropped, there is no 
relationship between size and transfers in India, and with its parliamentary institutions, 
                                                
4 To a large extent, the distribution of grants in Australia is driven by the grants commission.  
Nevertheless, the recommendations of the commission must be approved by the legislature, and some 
grants are still subject to direct influence by the legislature (Worthington and Dollery 1998).   
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weak upper chamber, and relatively minor malapportionment, in this respect it 
resembles Canada and Spain.   
In sum, it appears that when small jurisdictions are over-represented, particularly 
when the chief executive cannot use the threat of a no-confidence vote to promote 
legislative cohesion, they are attractive coalition partners for anyone hoping to achieve a 
change from the status quo, which allows them to extract larger shares of 
intergovernmental grants than other jurisdictions at similar income levels.  Under some 
conditions, this can generate legislative coalitions that undermine the correlation 
between income and expenditures that one might otherwise expect when the distribution 
of income across districts is right-skewed. 
 
Regional representation and the relevant income distribution 
Legislative representation based on regions rather than individuals might also 
undermine progressive redistribution through another mechanism, even if the regional 
jurisdictions are similar in population.  In Meltzer and Richard (1981) and more recent 
work in the same tradition, redistribution emerges in democracies because the decisive 
median voter is poor relative to the mean, and thus benefits from a progressive tax-
transfers scheme.  In the empirical literature (see Milanovic 2000), this is captured with 
gini coefficients or median/mean ratios of individuals.   
Yet this approach assumes away the existence of winner-take-all districts.  
Implicitly, it assumes something like Dutch proportional representation, where there is 
perfect proportionality between national votes and seats for each party, and the parties 
have incentives to concern themselves only with the national distribution of voter 
preferences.   If electoral competition takes place in winner-take-all districts, however, 
the parties must be concerned not with the national median voter, but rather, the median 
voter in the median district (Hinich and Ordeshook 1974).  Accordingly, the relevant 
income distribution in such systems is not that of individuals, but rather, that of district 
medians.    
This is a potentially important distinction.  Even if the distribution of individual 
income demonstrates a severe right skew within each district (and hence nationally), the 
distribution of district medians will be considerably less skewed.  Let us make the 
realistic assumption that individuals are clustered into neighborhoods with relatively 
homogeneous incomes.  If electoral districts are sufficiently small—say the size of a 
U.S. census block—the distribution of district medians will resemble the distribution of 
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individuals.  As districts get larger, they become more heterogeneous, and the average 
wealthy neighborhood is increasingly likely to be swallowed up into a district with an 
internal right skew to the distribution of individual income.  And as districts get larger, 
the right tail of the distribution of district medians is drawn dramatically toward the 
middle, and the shape becomes more symmetric.  In the extreme case—a federation 
with a small number of very large regional districts—the distribution of district medians 
is not skewed at all.   
For example, in U.S. census micro data the median/mean income ratio for all 
individuals is .74.  But if the relevant income distribution is that of the medians of U.S. 
Congressional districts, one obtains a much more even distribution shorn of a long right 
tail, and the median/mean ratio is .95.  However, if one considers the U.S. Senate, the 
relevant distribution is that of state medians, where the distribution is almost symmetric, 
and the median/mean ratio is .98.  In both Australia and Canada, the median/mean ratio 
for individuals is around .85, while that for the medians of parliamentary electoral 
districts is around .96, and that for state/provincial medians is .97.        
In a system with a single powerful legislative chamber and proportional 
representation, as in much of continental Europe, the right-skewed inter-personal 
income distribution is politically relevant, and the democratic process provides little 
hindrance to the formation of a low-income coalition that will implement redistribution.  
However, when the legislature is based on winner-take-all districts, legislative 
representatives have incentives to represent individuals with the median income in the 
legislative district, and collective choice in the legislatures is based on a less skewed 
distribution.  The median legislator will prefer a lower level of redistribution than would 
the median voter under proportional representation.  With an upper chamber based on 
equal representation of winner-take-all states or provinces, as in Argentina, Brazil, and 
the United States, the relevant income distribution is even less skewed, and the median 
representative prefers little redistribution.  By condensing the relevant income 
distribution and relying on collective choice among regional representatives rather than 
individuals, strong regional upper chambers can muffle demands for both inter-personal 
and inter-regional redistribution.  
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4.  Endogenous Federal Bargains 
 
One might think of federalism as a continuum where at one extreme, unanimity of 
provincial representatives is required for changes from the status quo, as in the EU 
Council of Ministers or the 18th century American Articles of Confederation.  At the 
other extreme, changes from the status quo require a simple majority of individuals 
rather than provincial representatives.   
The previous section argued that when countries entered the 20th century with 
limited central government tax powers, the former type of federation was able to resist 
attempts to form a cohesive low-income coalition that endeavors to centralize taxation 
and equalize service provision throughout the territory.  This argument has a similar 
flavor to Persson and Tabellini (1996), who establish conditions under which 
unemployment insurance would be greater if chosen through majority rule than if 
chosen through inter-regional bargaining, since the latter undermines the formation of a 
national coalition of “high-risk” individuals (see also Beramendi 2008).    
In other words, by maintaining institutional features like strong regional upper 
chambers and super-majority requirements, some federations share characteristics of the 
voluntary federalism envisioned by Bolton and Roland (1997) or Alesina and Spolaore 
(2003), while others share features of unitary systems.  But what accounts for these 
institutional differences?  Perhaps institutions and inter-regional transfers are both 
reflections of some deeper set of bargains or trade-offs.  It may be naïve to view inter-
regional redistribution as exploitation of the rich provinces by the poor if the rich could, 
at some cost, secede from the union.  Perhaps the transfers are in fact voluntary, and 
reflect the interests of rich, who are getting something important in return.   
This perspective yields important insights, especially if we expand the scope of 
analysis back to the initial bargains that gave rise to modern federations (Wibbels 2005).  
The centralization of tax power has been one of the thorniest issues in these bargains 
(see Diaz-Cayeros 2006).  Prior to World War I, the fights were primarily about tariffs, 
customs, and excise duties, and more recently, they have been about income taxation.  
In the federations of North and South America as well as Australia and the German 
Zollverein, one of the key reasons for confederation was to eliminate duties and other 
costly impediment to inter-state trade by centralizing the tariff and customs duties.  But 
centralization of the tariff in an era of proto-industrialization meant that the potential 
costs and benefits of confederation varied across regions in predictable ways.  Those 
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with the most to gain were industrialists in the burgeoning economic core, who desired 
a high tariff to protect nascent domestic manufacturing against foreign competition.  
The agricultural interests of the periphery invariably favored free trade and low tariffs, 
and if it implied locking themselves into a union with an economic core that had 
incentives to exploit them, they had the most to fear from confederation.  Thus contrary 
to contemporary autonomy movements in relatively wealthy and industrialized 
jurisdictions like Flanders, Lombardy, or Catalonia, prior to World War I the greatest 
skeptics of confederation were the farming and mining interests in the rural periphery.    
The historical legacy of these battles has shaped contemporary patterns of inter-
regional redistribution in two inter-related ways.  First, in some federations the 
representatives of the sparsely populated pastoral regions bargained for institutions, 
described above, that assured they would have a veto over proposed changes from the 
status quo.  Second, in some cases their fears were assuaged directly through fiscal 
transfers, and these transfers became the seed from which formal equalization payments 
grew several decades later.   
In the debates about confederation in Australia, the peripheral states of South 
Australia, Tasmania, and Western Australia were resistant to the idea of confederation 
out of concerns that with population-based representation, the wealthy and populous 
states, especially New South Wales, would be able to drive tariff policies that forced 
them to buy expensive domestic manufactured goods, and deprive them of their most 
important sources of tax revenue.  They refused to agree to confederation without equal 
representation of the states in a territorial upper chamber.  A history of exploitation and 
domination by Sao Paulo/Minas Gerais and Buenos Aires eventually led political 
entrepreneurs to strike stable constitutional deals that over-represented the periphery in 
Brazil and Argentina as well.  Realizing the potential usefulness of small rural states as 
coalition partners, Peron in the 1950s and the Brazilian military regime of the 1960s 
utilized a similar strategy of adding politically friendly, sparsely populated states (Diaz-
Cayeros 2006).    In the United States, while the conflict of slavery gets most of the 
attention, there was also an important conflict between Hamiltonian centralizers 
favoring a powerful central government and high tariffs designed to protect the 
emergent economic core, and those like Jefferson who preferred a weak, fragmented 
central government that provided agricultural interests with a veto over tariff and other 
tax policies.   
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These battles created a long historical legacy.  In each of these countries, when 
demands for further centralization of taxation and redistribution grew in the era of 
global war and depression, changes from the status quo required something well beyond 
a national majority of low-income individuals.  As revealed by the data presented 
earlier, coalition-building favored small jurisdictions, often at the expense of the poor.  
Only in Australia did the over-representation of the small coincide with that of the poor 
in a way that facilitated progressive inter-regional redistribution.  It is an historical irony 
that the fragmented federal institutions grudgingly granted by the enthusiastic 
centralizers of the commercial elite in the core may have eventually protected their 
grandchildren from demands for redistribution.5  
An interesting contrast to these federations is Canada, where one of the most 
pressing constitutional questions has always been whether confederation can be 
interpreted as a compact at all.  The project was driven by British loyalists and 
representatives of London, and “without the coaching, prodding, and fixing of imperial 
officials, Confederation would probably not have occurred” (Russell 1993: 20).  While 
some delegates from Canada West (Ontario) advocated for a stronger, elected upper 
chamber, most delegates favored an appointed upper chamber on the British model, 
although with some over-representation for the Maritimes, and given the recent 
experience with civil war, there were no advocates for any of the fragmenting 
institutional features of U.S. federalism.      
Early battles over the centralization of taxation may have generated not only 
institutions, but in some cases the transfers themselves.  In Canada and Australia, the 
first decades of Confederation were characterized by frequent secession threats from the 
skeptics of confederation in the periphery.  The most credible of these threats were from 
natural resource exporting provinces with their own ports or trade routes that would 
allow them to “go it alone” or join with an alternative economic core.  Western 
Australia, Nova Scotia, and eventually Western Canada are the clearest examples, and 
each flirted with secession throughout the early 20th century, using the resulting 
bargaining power to extract ad hoc transfers from the federal government.  Anger and 
alienation in the provinces of the periphery was fueled by tax centralization that stripped 
them of their most productive taxes, and tariffs that forced them to buy expensive 
                                                
5 Wibbels (2005) makes a more general version of this argument, hypothesizing that fragmented federal 
institutions with limited scope for redistribution came about as a result of conflict between factors of 
production. 
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domestic products.  In both countries, from the moment of confederation on, transfers 
were designed quite explicitly in Australia (Hancock and Smith 2001), and implicitly in 
Canada (Stevenson 2004), to compensate the periphery for the burdens of a union that 
aimed to create an industrialized society where agglomeration economies generate a 
“concentration of population and power, both political and economic, in the eastern 
centers” (Commonwealth Grants Commission 1935: 41).    In Australia, the Grants 
Commission made its first report advocating equalization at a time when Western 
Australia was petitioning the UK Parliament for the right to secede. 
In both countries, a system of ad hoc, negotiated compensation for burdens of 
industrialization morphed into a formal system of equalization in the 1930s and 1940s, 
when the cause was taken up by a low-income coalition.  The “burdens of 
confederation” were quite difficult to measure, and this rhetoric was replaced with one 
emphasizing both the efficiency and justice of equal service provision.  Thereafter, the 
call for equal service provision across the federation was a central part of the platform 
of the parties of the left.  Even though parties of the right experimented with platforms 
that would have rolled back or eliminated equalization, the transfers were already a 
long-standing status quo, and the political risks of alienating voters in recipient 
jurisdictions was too high.  With the exception of those states in the periphery that 
became wealthy from oil and other natural resources, these peripheral states developed 
long-term dependence upon the central government, and secession threats are now a 
thing of the distant past.   
While the circumstances under which federal bargains were struck more than a 
century ago seem to provide useful insights in older federations, what about countries 
like Germany or Spain that experienced long interregnums of centralized 
authoritarianism, with a contemporary federal bargain that occurred after World War II 
in an era of tax centralization?      
In the negotiations leading up to the German Basic Law and the system of fiscal 
equalization in the aftermath of World War II, the representatives of the relatively 
wealthy states desired a decentralized system of taxation and fought for a strictly origin-
based system of transfers in areas where central taxation was viewed as necessary.  By 
examining the bargaining among states in occupied Germany prior to the negotiation of 
the Basic Law, one gets a glimpse of what a voluntary bargain would have looked like.  
It could not possibly have been redistributive.  Initially, the wealthy states even resisted 
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efforts to arrange relatively small subsidies for states that were overwhelmed by war 
refugees (Renzsch 1991).     
Yet ultimately the Basic Law was negotiated not by unanimity rule among 
Länder, but among national party leaders.  The wealthy states were not in a position to 
threaten secession, and with the allies impatient for a deal, the CDU—with its 
preference for a more decentralized and less redistributive system—was not in a 
position to hold up the negotiations.  Given its powerful position in the constitutional 
assembly, the SPD was able to bargain for a constitution that represented the interests of 
a low income coalition from the beginning, and it was able to enshrine a system of 
transfers meant to achieve “equivalent living conditions” directly in the constitution.   
In Spain as well, it seems likely that a voluntary union among representatives of 
regional governments in the late 1970s would have generated a much less redistributive 
system than the one that emerged.  Such governments had not yet been constituted, and 
even though the tax-transfers system was broadly unsatisfactory for representatives of 
Catalonia and the proposed institutions provided few protections, the default payoff was 
very unattractive given the risk of a return to authoritarianism (Colomer 1998).6           
  
5.  Conclusion 
 
Exploitation of the rich by the poor is impossible in a voluntary pact among sovereigns 
where the rich can secede.  But fiscal redistribution from rich to poor regions can 
happen even in a voluntary union.  Market integration can generate “peripheralization,” 
whereby agglomeration and urbanization economies push economic activity toward the 
core, and in order to achieve a common market, the burgeoning core must compensate 
the periphery for these risks.  This helps explain early precursors to equalization 
transfers in Canada and Australia, and the European Structural Funds today.   
Once a common market has been established, wars and depressions have paved 
the way for further tax centralization, and secession threats have lost their bite, 
intergovernmental transfers can become an important tool for political entrepreneurs 
                                                
6 Perhaps the most striking outlier in this chapter is India.  The constitutional bargain did not include 
presidentialism or strong protections for states, and as in Germany, the constitution calls for efforts at 
inter-regional redistribution.  Yet intergovernmental grants do little to combat inter-regional inequalities.  
One possible explanation is the fact that India was governed until recently by a hegemonic party that used 
discretionary transfers to allied state governments as a way to cement its dominance, and more recently, 
by fragile coalitions of regional parties.  In this context, no political party has been able to build a national 
low-income coalition.    
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who wish to mobilize the poor.  In this context, an institutional legacy of bargains and 
battles among sovereigns places limits on the possibility of inter-regional redistribution 
by shaping the requirements for changes from the status quo.  Institutions of federal 
fragmentation that once protected the small and peripheral can now be of use for the 
rich as well.   
Some decentralized countries that have many of the trappings of federalism do 
not retain any of the institutional baggage from a bygone era of federation-formation, or 
never had any in the first place.  The prime examples in this paper are Canada and 
Spain, but one finds a comparable dynamic in Italy, Belgium, and the UK.  In these 
countries, changes from the status quo require simple national majorities of individuals 
or small districts, and with a right-skewed income distribution, the wealthy are at the 
mercy of the poor just as in a unitary democracy.  Bilateral and multilateral 
“negotiations” over taxes and transfers are conducted between the center and provinces 
with great sound and fury, but in the end, the center reserves the right to act unilaterally, 
and frequently does so.   
In such countries, it is quite natural that wealthy taxpayers in wealthy regions 
wish to move in the direction of U.S. federalism, where taxes are highly decentralized 
and the central government’s expenditures are not very progressive.  Yet when the low-
income coalition is entrenched and a high level of redistribution is already the status 
quo, their options are limited.  Moderates support regional parties that attempt to disrupt 
the low-income coalition and bargain for concessions in the legislature, while extremists 
seek secession.  This dynamic captures the fault lines of an important political conflict 
in Europe and beyond.  It remains to be seen whether the genie of inter-regional 
redistribution, once set free, can be squeezed back into the bottle. 
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Data Appendix 
 
Argentina:  Fiscal data and gross provincial product are from the Ministry of Economy, 
Subsecretary of Regional Programming, adjusted for inflation using the CPI developed 
by Sanguinetti and Tommasi (1997).  Provincial population data are from the National 
Institute of Statistics and Census. 
Australia:  Fiscal data are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Government Finance 
Statistics State government series, adjusted for inflation using the CPI of the largest city 
in the state (produced by ABS).  Gross state product and population data are from ABS 
state accounts.  All data were obtained directly from the ABS.      
Brazil:  Fiscal data were obtained directly from the Ministry of Finance: Minestério da 
Fazenda, Secretaria do Tesouro Nactional, Coordinação-Geral das Relações e Análise 
Financeira de Estados e Municipios.  Inflation adjustment was conducted using the 
INPC deflator prepared by IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Departamento de Indices de 
Preços.   Population and gross state product are from IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, 
Departamento de Contas Nacionais, Contas Regionais do Brasil, microdados. 
Canada:  All data are from Statistics Canada, CANSIM series, deflated using 
provincial-level CPI.     
Germany:  Fiscal data are from the Statistisches Bundesamt, accessed from 
http://www.statistik-bund.de (no longer in service, replaced by www.destatis.de).  Land-
level GDP, population, and Land-specific deflators were provided directly by the 
Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Finance.   
India:  Population and inflation-adjusted fiscal data were kindly provided by Shahrokh 
Fardoust at the World Bank.  Inflation-adjusted gross state domestic product data were 
obtained from the Reserve Bank of India.     
Spain:  Data were provided by Pablo Beramendi and Erik Wibbels. 
USA:  Fiscal and population data were obtained directly from the Census Department.  
Fiscal data were adjusted for inflation with the national CPI produced by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  CPI and gross state 
product were obtained from the BEA web page:  www.bea.gov. 
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